Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1985

The State of Utah v. Johnnie Patrick Knight : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Knight, No. 198520670.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/555

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTA H

THE STATE OF UTAH,
P1 ain t i f f / Re spoi iden t

vs.
Case No,

JOHNNIE PATRICK KN-J.GHT,

20670

De f e rician L / Appe 11 a n t

LEI- -./P APPELLANT
h'opc-ial
Robbery, a Vlrr.z

from a

•; let ion and inda^nj- of

^cqr>jr^ Felony, in the Tiux,.

K.*. J, W JL CI. X

in and !:o • '•• • : Lake County, State of Utah,
B . D e e , J •..;..;.;

v

: ;:' id • :ig .

JO CAROL
Salt Lak
3 33 South
Salt Lake
'elephone :
Attorney

DAVID L. WILKINSON''
At to rne y Gene r a1
•23 6 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

V*?--J444
ouellan

LJ J_ O <

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT,

Case No.

20670

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial District,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David
B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

JO CAROL NESSET-SALE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc,
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

Statement of Facts
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1
6

ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

THE STATE'S WITHHOLDING OF PRE-TRIAL
STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO KEY WITNESSES
AND THE SURPRISE CALLING OF THOSE
WITNESSES VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

7

A. THE STATE VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO
TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ALL STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES, WHICH PROMISE WAS.
RELIED UPON BY THE DEFENSE, AND THEREFORE THE STATE SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM
DENYING ITS OBLIGATION ON THE BASIS THAT
SUCH OBLIGATION IS NOT REQUIRED BY
STATUTE
. 10
B. KNOWLEDGE OF STATEMENTS IN THE
HANDS OF ANY PART OF THE PROSECUTION
TEAM IS CHARGED TO THE PROSECUTION. . . . 15
POINT II:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE
DEFENDANT WOULD SUFFER PREJUDICE FROM
A JOINT TRIAL WITH THE CO-DEFENDANT . . . 20

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DECLARE MISTRIAL AFTER EVIDENCE HAD
BEEN ADMITTED STATING THAT THE
APPELLANT HAD BEEN IN PRISON AND
ON PAROLE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST ,

26

CONCLUSION.

30

ADDENDUMS ,

A-C

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964)
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980)
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103(1935)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980)
State v. Rivenburgh, 355 P.2d 689 (Utah 1960)
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984)
Strickland v. Washington,
U.S.
, 80 L.Ed 2d
674 (1984)
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
United States v. Cronic,
U.S.
, 104 S.Ct.
2039 (1984)

15,16
19
10
29
28,29
19
9,10
10
19,20
23,24,25
23
15,16
17
13,14
17,18

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16 (1953 as amended)

ii

21,22,23
9,10,11

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the Appellant's right to a fair trial and

right to effective assistance of counsel violated as a result
of the prosecution's failure to comply with its promise to
fulfill the requests contained in the Appellant's motion to
discover?
2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to sever the

co-defendants?
3.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant

Appellant's motion for mistrial after the jury heard statements
that the Appellant had been in prison and was on parole at the
time of his arrest?

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT,

Case No.

20670

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Johnnie
Patrick Knight for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended).
A jury found him guilty following a trial on March 12-13, 1985,
in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

He was

committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term
of five years to life.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 2, 1984, the One-Hour Martinizing Cleaners
located at 1689 South West Temple was robbed of approximately
$85.50 (T. I at 52,58,65-66).

The manager, Bruce Andersen, and

another employee, Teresa Jensen, were present in the cleaners
as the robbery was committed (T. I at 52). Mr. Andersen testified

that two men, both wearing dark hats and sweaters and bandanas
over their faces, entered the cleaners from the rear door, an
entrance for employees and salesmen only (T. I at 53). One of
the men had a revolver-type pistol, and the other had a solid
blade hunting knife (T. I at 54). Mr. Andersen was forced to
lie on the floor while Ms. Jensen opened the cash register
till.
55-56).

She was then told to lie beside Mr. Andersen (T. I at
The man with the gun then reached down and took Mr.

Andersen's checkbook and wallet from his back pocket and cut
the telephone cord.

The two men then fled (T. I at 56).

Ms. Jensen testified that just moments before the
robbery a man had walked into the cleaners through the
front customer entrance (T. I at 65). He asked for directions
and then left.

She identified Jeff Richens through a police

photo lineup as the man (T. I at 65). Mr. Richens had admitted
taking part in the robbery and was the State's primary eyewitness
(T. II at 41). Neither Ms. Jensen nor Mr. Andersen were able to
identify either of the masked robbers, although Ms. Jensen said
that she could see blonde hair below the cap that one of the men
was wearing (T. I at 69).
Christopher Laub, a motorist who happened to be driving
along West Temple at the time, saw the men as they ran out of the
cleaners (T. I at 74). He followed in his car as the men ran
down the middle of West Temple and then down an alley to a car
(T. I at 75). He testified that there was a person with long hair
whom he thought was a woman get out of the car in order to let one of
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the fleeing men into the back seat (T. I at 75-76).

Mr. Laub

wrote down the license plate number of the car he observed
(T. I at 77). This car, later found in West Valley, was
registered to Kim Richens, the wife of Jeff Richens (T. I
at 93) .
Jeffery Richens testified for the State in return for
a guilty plea to attempted robbery, after admitting involvement
in the cleaner's robbery (T. II at 41). Also Richens acknowledged that he had prior robbery and burglary convictions
(T. II at 41).
During his testimony Richens said that he, the
Appellant Johnnie Knight, and a co-defendant Joseph Ridlon
met at Richens' apartment on February 2, 1984 (T. II at 43).
He testified that they left the apartment about mid-morning in
his wife's car for the purpose of casing out possible businesses
to rob (T. II at 44). Mr. Richens stated that he dropped off
Mr. Knight and Mr. Ridlon at approximately 300 West and 1700 South,
and then drove to an alley where he parked, and remained in the
car for about fifteen minutes, at which time the Appellant and
Ridlon came running back to the car, Ridlon carrying a sack of
money (T. II at 50). Richens testified that he then drove the
three men to an apartment complex where Ridlonrs girlfriend
lived (T. II at 53). After a few minutes Richens and the
Appellant left the apartment on foot and met shortly thereafter
at a small grocery store, where they called a friend of the

Appellantfs who came and picked the men up (T. II at 54-55).
Ron Nelson, a robbery detective with the Salt Lake
City Police Department, testifed that the day of the robbery he
was dispatched to a housing project in West Valley City to
investigate a suspect vehicle (T. I at 91). Detective Nelson
found the driver's license and Visa charge card belonging to
Bruce Andersen, the manager of the cleaners, in the back
seat of the car (T. I at 92). After obtaining permission from
Kim Richens, the owner of the car, Detective Nelson opened the
trunk of the car (T. I at 96-97).

In the trunk he found several

animal traps, miscellaneous tools, miscellaneous clothing, and
a wallet belonging to Johnnie Knight (T. I at 97-98).

There

was no money in the wallet (T. I at 98). Detective Nelson
seized these items.
On February 6, 1984, Detective Nelson personally
questioned the Appellant in connection with the robbery, after
which the Appellant was not arrested, but released.

In July,

Detective Nelson received a letter from the Appellant requesting
his wallet because his identification was in the wallet.
Detective Nelson testified that he sent Mr. Knight his wallet
because no charges had been filed against Mr. Knight and there
seemed to be no legal reason to keep his items (T. I at 102).
Detective Nelson testified that there was no case against the
Appellant until November 1984 when Jeff Richens agreed to
testify against Mr. Knight in his plea arrangement (T. I at 103).
Georgia Moore, an acquaintance of the Appellant
Johnnie Knight and of Jeffery Richens, testified that Richens

and Knight came to her apartment at about 10:00 a.m. to use the
telephone and stayed for at most one hour (T. I at 113-114).
She testified that the next time she saw the Appellant was
the following day at the University of Utah.

She said that

Mr. Knight asked her to be his alibi for the preceding day
because he was being investigated for a robbery which he did not
commit, that he had been with his girlfriend but he did not
want his wife to find out (T. I at 115). Ms. Moore testified
that she agreed to be Appellant's alibi and repeated this lie
several times to investigators (T. I at 115-117).

During the

month of May, Ms. Moore contacted the investigating detective
and told him that her alibi had been a lie (T. I at 117-118).
Ms. Moore acknowledged under cross-examination that she did
not retract her alibi until after the Moore family and the
Johnnie Knight family had had a falling out over unrelated
matters (T. II at 26-35).

The hostility between the Moores

and the Knights became so intense that Georgia Moore sent
Johnnie Knight a letter which said in part, "John, Kenny's
back at the point.

You'll be seeing him soon.

Say hi for

me" (T. II at 34). It was at this point that Ms. Moore told
police that she was lying about the alibi.
Walter Moore, Georgia's estranged husband, was a
surprise witness flown into Salt Lake City from Montana the
morning of his testimony (see argument Point I).

Mr. Moore

testified that on the day of the robbery he had gotten home
from his classes at Utah Technical College at approximately
1:40 p.m. (T. II at 91). About twenty minutes later he

received a telephone call from the Appellant, Johnnie Knight,
who said that he and Jeff Richens had had car trouble and
asked Mr. Moore to pick them up at a small grocery store on
Redwood Road (T. II at 93). Mr. Moore said he agreed and drove
to the store and picked up Knight and Richens (T. II at 94).
He testified that Knight and Richens asked him to drive by the
car to make sure it was all right, which he did (T. II at 94).
Mr. Moore recognized the car as that of Jeff Richens (T. II at
94) .
After hearing this evidence, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty as to the Appellant, Johnnie Knight.

The

jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to the co-defendant,
Joseph Ridlon, even though the primary witness against both
defendants was Jeff Richens, who equally implicated both
defendants.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant urges this court to reverse his conviction
for a number of related reasons.

The prosecution's failure to

comply with the written request for discovery, when by letter
they had agreed to do so, started the chain of errors.

To

his detriment the Appellant reasonably relied upon written
representation from the County Attorney's Office that all
information requested had been supplied.
The court erred in allowing the testimony of Georgia
and Walter Moore, when the state had not provided either their
addresses, once their locations had become known to the State,
or their prior statements.

The court further erred in denying a motion for a
mistrial because of the surprise witnesses and denying subsequent
motions for a continuance, for severance, and for permission of
Appellant's counsel to withdraw, where she claimed she had not
and could not represent the Appellant effectively where she was
unprepared for the surprise witnesses and had badly advised
Appellant regarding a plea offer in light of the newly disclosed
evidence.
Finally, Appellant's right to a fair and impartial
trial was compromised by several references by witnesses and
the judge himself regarding the prisoner/inmate status of the
Appellant.

The court erred in denying motions for a mistrial

on these bases.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE STATE'S WITHHOLDING OF PRE-TRIAL STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO KEY WITNESSES AND THE
SURPRISE CALLING OF THOSE WITNESSES VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
AND RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
At trial, the State called Georgia Moore as a witness.
Ms. Moore testified that for several months she had provided
an alibi for Appellant, telling police that Mr. Knight had been
in her apartment drinking coffee at the time the robbery was
committed.

At some point in July 1983 Ms. Moore changed her

mind, and told Detective Nelson that she had lied about the
alibi.

On cross-examination Ms. Moore said that Detective

Ron Nelson arranged for her to make a statement to the County
Attorney, which she did in July (T. I at 118-119).

Because

this was the first information defense counsel had about a
statement to the prosecutor, defense counsel immediately
objected and said that she would not feel comfortable proceeding with the cross-examination until she had read the
statement (T. I at 119). The prosecutor, Mr. McKelvie,
responded that he had no knowledge whether the statement was
either recorded or transcribed (Id..) .
After trial had adjourned for the day, Brad Adamson
of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office gave defense counsel,
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, a copy of the statement made to him by Ms.
Moore, in which she stated her alibi for Appellant was a lie.
During a telephone conversation that evening, Mr. Adamson told
Ms. Nesset-Sale that he would look through his file to see
if he had anything else that she did not have.

He then asked

her if she had a statement by Walt Moore, the then estranged
husband of Georgia Moore.

Ms. Nesset-Sale replied that she

did not have the statement, so Mr. Adamson brought her a copy
of it.

The contents of that statement (as set out under the

testimony of Walt Moore in the Facts statement) were a total
surprise to defense counsel and extremely damaging to the
defense of the Appellant (T. II at 2) .
At trial, defense counsel not only learned of these
statements for the first time, but she also learned for the
first time that the prosecution had located and subpoenaed Walt
and Georgia Moore.

Prior to trial, both the prosecution and the

defense had tried unsuccessfully several times to locate the
Moores.

Defense counsel knew that the Moores were potential

witnesses, but because Mr. McKelvie had told her as late as
the Friday before the trial that the State's subpoenas had been
returned as undeliverable, Ms. Nesset-Sale did not plan her
defense in anticipation of the Moore's presence.

This latter

point is of minor significance because defense counsel was kept
uninformed of what the testimony of the Moores would be, the
county attorney neither providing an address for Mr. or Mrs.
Moore, once each had been located, nor making available to
defense counsel their prior statements, both of which had
been requested in discovery under Rule 16 of the Utah Code
of CriminaJ Procedure, compliance with which the prosecutor
had conceded in

his secretary's letter.

(See Addendum A ) .

Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial (T. II at 4), which
was denied (T. II at 11). Counsel then made a motion to continue
until the afternoon (T. II at 11) which, although no objection
was voiced by the prosecution, was likewise denied by Judge Dee.
In an early ruling on what nondisclosures by a prosecutor
violate due process, the United States Supreme Court in Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) stated:
It is a requirement that cannot be
deemed to be satisfied by mere notice
and hearing if a State has contrived
a conviction through the pretense of
a trial which in truth is but used as
a means of depriving a defendant of
liberty through a deliberate deception
of court and jury by the presentation of
testimony known to be perjured. Such
a contrivance by a State to procure the
conviction and imprisonment of a defendant
is as inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of justice as is the obtaining
of a like result by intimidation.

The holding of Mooney was extended in Napue v. Illinois/ 360 U.S.
264, 269 (1959):

"The same result obtains when the state, although

not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when
it appears."

The obligation of the state to correct false evidence

referred to in Napue

should apply to correcting the evidence with

defense counsel as well as with the court.

The statement of

Georgia Moore, saying that she had lied about the Appellant's
alibi clearly should have been provided to the defense even
without a request, under Napue.

The Court clarified its Mooney

and Napue stand in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 37 (1963) by
stating:
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is
not punishment of society for misdeeds
of a prosecutor but avoidance of an
unfair trial to the accused. Society
wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials
are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly.
Appellant contends that his due process right to a fair
trial had been violated by the state's withholding of the statements
of Georgia and Walt Moore as well as the surprise calling of those
witnesses.
A. THE STATE VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO
TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ALL STATEMENTS
OF WITNESSES, WHICH PROMISE WAS RELIED
UPON BY THE DEFENSE, AND THEREFORE THE
STATE SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING
ITS OBLIGATION ON THE BASIS THAT SUCH
OBLIGATION IS NOT REQUIRED BY STATUTE.
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16 (1953 as amended) dealing with
discovery states:
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(a) Except as otherwise provided, the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense
upon request the following material or
information of which he has knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the
defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or
mitigate the degree of the offense for
reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown should
be made available to the defendant in order
for the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures
as soon as practicable following the filing of
charges and before the defendant is required to
plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to
make disclosure.
(g) If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention -of
the court that a party has failed to comply with
this rule, the court may order such party to
permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter
such other orders as it deems just under the
circumstances.
Appellant concedes that the statements of Walt and Georgia
Moore were inculpatory in nature and therefore the state was not
required by statute to provide the statements short of a court order
requiring them to do so.

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-16(a)(5).

For

this reason, the Appellant's counsel filed a timely pre-trial
motion to discover.

(See Addendum B ) .

was a request for an order to disclose:

Included in this motion
"A,

A list of all the

witnesses the state intends to call for trial, their addresses

and telephone numbers," and "B.

Any recordings, reports, transcripts,

or reports about statements in possession of any member, or group
involved in the prosecution or the investigation of the . . . case
taken from the witnesses listed in point 2A above."

A hearing on

this motion to discovery was set for February 8, 1985, before
Judge David Dee.

Notice of the hearing was delivered to the

County Attorney's Office.

(See Addendum C ) .

Soon after the motion had been filed and the hearing
set, defense counsel contacted the County Attorney's Office to
see if they would be willing to voluntarily comply with the
discovery request, without having to obtain a court order.

The

County Attorney's Office agreed to turn over the information in
voluntary compliance with the motion to discover.

Within approx-

imately two days defense counsel received a letter addressed to
her from the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office confirming the
agreement.

It stated, "Re:

Dear Jo Carol:

Enclosed you will find the requested information

on the above subject.
please let us know."
Binkerd.

JOHNNIE KNIGHT, Motion to Discover—

If we can be of any further assistance
This letter was signed by a secretary, Joan

(See Addendum A ) .

The letter did not say that certain

parts of the motion to discover would be complied with while other
parts would not.

It did not contain any conditions at all.

The

reasonable conclusion drawn from this letter was that the office
was complying with the provisions of the motion to discover.
Acting in reliance on this promise, and believing that she had
been given all previous statements that possible witnesses had
made, defense counsel withdrew her motion to discover; therefore,
no court order was obtained.

However, as counsel learned at trial,

she had not received the statement made by Georgia Moore that
indicated that she had lied in providing Mr, Knight's alibi;
counsel had not received the statement of Walt Moore which put
Johnnie Knight with Jeff Richens minutes after the robbery on
Redwood Road, telephoning and asking him for a ride home, and
later asking him to drive past the car Appellant and Richens
had just abandoned.
The defendant's request for discovery was specific,
clearly worded to inform the county attorney of exactly what was
being requested.

The U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a very similar

situation in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

In

Agurs, the appellant argued that the prosecution's failure to
inform him of the criminal record of his alleged murder victim
violated his right to a fair trial.

The Supreme Court held that

the prosecutor's failure to so inform the defense did not deny
the appellant his right to a fair trial because the defense
counsel had not requested the information, the information
was not material to any defense to the crime and because there
was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant even if the
omitted information had been admitted into evidence.

The court

described the obligation of the prosecution when information is
requested, stating:
In Brady the request was specific.
It gave the prosecutor notice of
exactly what the defense desired.
Although there is, of course, no
duty to provide defense counsel
with unlimited discovery of everything known by the prosecutor, if
the subject matter of such a request
is material, or indeed if a substantial
basis for claiming materiality exists,

it is reasonable to require the
prosecutor to respond either by
furnishing the information or by
submitting the problem to the trial
judge. When the prosecutor receives
a specific and relevant request, the
failure to make any response is seldom,
if ever, excusable.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106.

Although Agurs dealt with potentially

exculpatory evidence, the same reasoning should clearly hold true
where the prosecutor has voluntarily promised to turn over all
statements, inculpatory as well as exculpatory, made by witnesses
the state intends to call.

If the prosecutor had decided not to

comply with his promise, he should have so informed defense counsel
because "the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever,
excusable." (Id..) .
In addition to the basic issue of the fairness of the
resulting surprise testimony to the defendant, there are extremely
important practical policy reasons why this Court should not
tolerate behavior of the type exhibited by the prosecution in this
case.

Agreements and promises between prosecutors and defense

attorneys are an integral part of our criminal justice system.
With the current backlog of motions, hearings, and trials in
our state courts, it has become a practical necessity for
prosecutors and defense attorneys alike to rely on the promises
of their opponent rather than go through the protracted process
of obtaining court orders, at least when such cooperation is
feasible.

While it is not contended by the Appellant that the

prosecutor's withholding of statements which he had agreed to
turn over to the defense was purposeful or intentional, the
effect of the prosecutor's actions is to erode the confidence of

defense counsel in such informal agreements.

This erosion of

confidence in informal agreements can only lead to a substantial
increase in the number of formal court motions filed and hearings
set.

Therefore, it is in the interest of all to maintain at least

a threshhold level of trust in the integrity of the opponent party
where agreements have been voluntarily entered into.
B. KNOWLEDGE OF STATEMENTS IN THE HANDS
OF ANY PART OF THE PROSECUTION TEAM IS
CHARGED TO THE PROSECUTION.
In partial response to defense counsel's objection to
the surprise statements and testimony of Georgia and Walt Moore,
Mr. McKelvie, the deputy county attorney prosecuting the case,
responded that he had had no knowledge of the existence of Walt
Moore's statement until that morning.

He stated:

Apparently Sergeant Adamson from our
office had an interview with Mr. Moore
in January of this year while Carvel
Harward from our office was the prosecutor on this case. When Mr. Harward
went to Davis County I was assigned the
case, and as far as I knew all the information I had was contained in the file that
Mr. Harward gave me.
(T. II at 5).

Brad Adamson, referred to by Mr. McKelvie as

Sergeant Adamson, is an investigator employed by the County
Attorney's Office, as well as a police officer.

It was Mr.

Adamson who took the statements of Walt and Georgia Moore.
It is clear that even if the prosecutor, Mr. McKelvie,
did not have the statements personally, the statements are to
be treated as in his possession if they are in the possession
of any member of the prosecution team.

In State v. Shabata, 678

P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984), this Court, citing Barbee v. Warden,

331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964), stated:
At the outset, we stress that we are
concerned with more than the prosecutor's
state of knowledge. . . . Information
known to police officers working on the
case is charged to the prosecution since
the officers are part of the prosecution
team. Neither the prosecutor nor officers
working on a case may withhold exculpatory
evidence or evidence valuable to a defendant.
The important question here is whether the
defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutions
failure to disclose [the requested information].
For purposes of this question, the good or bad
faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant. "If
the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character
of the evidence, not the character of the
prosecutor."
(Citations omitted).
While State v. Shabata dealt with potentially exculpatory
evidence, the case certainly stands for principle that the knowledge
and evidence of any part of the prosecution team is charged to the
prosecutor personally.

Therefore, the fact that Mr. McKelvie did

not personally have the statements until the day of the testimony
of Walt and Georgia Moore was irrelevant.

The County Attorney f s

investigator had the statements, and testimony in accordance with
those statements was elicited by Mr. McKelvie.
Regarding the whereabouts of Georgia and Walt Moore, at
some point in advance of the day of trial, the prosecution learned
of their locations, yet failed to notify the defendant although
the duty to comply with disclosures is a continuing duty.

The

state knew sufficiently in advance to arrange air travel for Mr.
Moore from Montana yet did not attempt to notify defense counsel
until the trial began.

C. T H E FAILURE OF T H E PROSECUTION TO
DELIVER T H E REQUESTED STATEMENTS A S
AGREED RENDERED T H E APPELLANT'S COUNSEL
INEFFECTIVE.
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had not bpen provided !• her rind sh«»IP I

. '

-as unprepaied

to cross-examine M r , Moore and the surprise had substantially
prejudiced M r Knight'^ defense,
a

I

Defc

ade a motj

for a few hours -;
her client

r

nar sne- -M-.

prepar~

denied t h e A^
made

Th i s mo+ 'or w a s denied (T. II

\ motion

: • ::: 01 itinue the trial

- discuss t h e new evidence with

*• - r-~'

,

.:ri -:*

ma*

.
thdraw

Dee si immari I i

y, aefense counsel

counsel because the statements of

w

effectively represent the defendant during the 'rial ^iven r.ne
court's refusal to exclude Walt Moore's testimony or
ironl. i uudiM i • IT

II ill I " I

rrant a

This motion was also denied (Id.) .

The United States Supreme Court addressed effectiveness
of counsel in two recent compain on rvise.s

I i,

^ o f I" ho.si

Strickland v . W a s h i n g t o n , _ _ _ U.S. _ _ , MO L, Ed 2d 67 4

•.'i.or-'.s ,
( i ,:)H 4) ,

the court considered a claim, of ineffectiveness of counsel where
the dpfV

•

I lad h :i nisei f

•

i ' •*

•'

J

assistance by simply failing to render adequate Legai jssisi.arce.
* •h^ other case. United States v. Cronic,

U.S. _

, 104 S

irt re so 1 ved a c 1 a iin o f i ne £ f ect ivene s s :) f
counsel v/here the government violated the defendant's right to
counsel by interferring with the abi 1 1 1

c

• " tsel to

independent decisions about h o w to conduc; : ..^ defense.

1

is

this latter type of ineffectiveness of counsel that Appellant
claims.
In Cronic/ the appellant was charged in connection
with a "check kiting" scheme.
withdrew from the case.

Shortly before trial his attorney

The trial court appointed a young lawyer

with a real estate practice to represent the defendant, despite
the fact the attorney had never participated in a jury trial.
The attorney was allowed twenty-five days for pre-trial investigation,
even though it had taken the government four and one-half years to
investigate the case and review thousands of documents.

The Supreme

Court held that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in
finding a per se violation of the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel, without requiring some evidence of actual
prejudice at the trial.

The Court stated that prejudice cannot

be merely inferred, although "[t]here are . . . circumstances that
are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating
their effect in a particular case is unjustified."

(.Id. at 667).

The Court then pointed out that it ". . . has uniformly found
constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when
counsel was wither totally absent, or prevented from assisting
the accused during a critical stage of the proceedings."

(Id.,

footnote 25 at 668). The Appellant herein, Johnnie Knight, contends
that his attorney's reliance on the promise of the prosecutor and
resulting failure to follow through with the Motion to Discover,
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel during the
pre-trial stage and his trial.

The actions of the prosecutor, in

recanting by effect his promise to provide all statements and

and dd(1 resses nil w i f D P -IS* »S [ ir^VPii I ei I defense i niunse] truni
adequately advising the Appellant during the plea process,
as well as preventing defense counsel from formulating an
adequate defense,

Appel LdMl. .'MI! be*1!! ulfered HI plea bargain

in which he could have plead r..> a tnird degree felony.

With

trie o^Iv known incriminating, evidence being the testimony uf;
L, e :.: ;. Lchens, a convicted t eion , defense counsel f s advice
to defendant w a s considerably different than it would have been
Y
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.
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Unit

-ii n l

•

i

George -J -n.^i -

The nnit-^n states Supreme Court h a s recognized that the
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assistance o ii

counsel.

McMann v . Richardson, 397 U.S . /r>9 {1 47(11

because oi *
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?nee nf effpr 5
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the Court upheld the constitutionality ^i
in North Carolina v . Alford, 400
\

the standard
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r

i.

voluntariness

m o Bordenkircher
. * erated

a

; i -juilty plea depends upon the
, nfn] 1 ; M O - . • choice amoncf the
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Court held that a guilt
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Hayes
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. --io^a+. . .•,. >f due process for
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prosecutor to

threaten tw charge C J Lix^ laiicst extent UiaL ne can JL£ the accused

does not accept an offered plea bargain.

The Court premised this

holding on the existence of competent, informed defense counsel
advising the accused during the plea process.
Under circumstances, it is clear that defense counsel
was rendered ineffective by the state's failure to provide the
full discovery it had agreed to supply, and the resulting
inadequate advice regarding the plea bargain, and inadequate
advocacy at trial.

In a criminal justice system where plea

bargains are an accepted practice, situations, such as the present
one, arise in which a defendant's best course of action is a
guilty plea to a lesser offense, even where innocence is
maintained and the plea entered under Alford, supra.

Therefore,

it is as important that a plea of innocent be intelligently
made as it is for a plea of guilty to be intelligently made.
At trial, defense counsel also had to contend with the
co-defendant's strategy which became very hostile towards the
defendant in response to the Moore's testimony (see Point II).
In light of the foregoing, and in light of the trial court's refusal
to take any corrective steps whatsoever, the Appellant contends
that the actions of the state have denied him his fifth, sixth,
and fourteenth amendment

rights to a fair trial and effective

assistance of counsel.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL WHEN
IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE DEFENDANT WOULD
SUFFER PREJUDICE FROM A JOINT TRIAL WITH
THE CO-DEFENDANT.
At the close of the first day of trial defense counsel

4

learned

;r the first

i ru -ho*- W i - Moore had been

witness

o< following day

;

o

!

!

ocated in

nis was also the

first time that defense counsel was provided with statements
made by Wa 1 t a i id Georgia Moore t:.o toe county attorney *s
investigate r

everal months previously

adjourned 101 f
defendar* fs
ment that
the

H O P rn»defn-<J- .

ay

counse. that he intendec i
•
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. fi

, ,. .
at-jutr , ::i closing argu-

Richens and the defendant
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involve

fter trial had

committed
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This riad not been the planned defense
• when -it was discovered that Wa ] t a nd

of the co-defendant,
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• -ch a way as to cieai +.»

implicate Appellaro our :xo his co-defendant, trie co-defendant's
efrsi

counse
Accordingly , ..

counsel for Appellant filed

a motion for * ;str a! based r>n * 'N- substantial prejudice the
dei <*r - •

- ..< wi 1::1: 1 bl i = co -defendant

foi t r wi

it 85-86

.-is 'not.i- •• was denied (T. II at

88) .

§77-35-9 (d) (1953 -is amended) requires thcii nation
filed
was
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planned by the defendant and co-defendant were not mutually
-, 9 1

ses

antagonistic.

Counsel for both defendant and co-defendant told

Judge Dee that if they had been provided with the statements of
Walt and Georgia Moore before trial, they would have separately
filed a timely motion to sever (T. II at 83-84, 86). Thus the
motion for mistrial was based on the prejudice to the defendant
in not having his trial severed.

This motion for mistrial was

based on the misconduct of the prosecution, and this argument
is not precluded from appeal by Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9 (d)
requiring a timely pre-trial motion to sever.

Alternatively, if

this Court views this argument as one of abuse of discretion in
refusing to sever, it would deny the Appellant due process of the
law to preclude this argument from appeal based on the procedural
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9(d) where the failure to
file a timely motion to sever was due to misconduct on the part
of the prosecution.
The Utah statute regarding joinder and severance of
defendants is Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9 (1953 as amended).
applicable sections state:
(b) Two or more defendants may be
charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct in
the same criminal episode. Such defendants
may be charged in one or more counts
together or separately and all of the
defendants need not be charged in each
account. When two or more defendants are
jointly charged with any offense, they
shall be tried jointly unless the court
in its discretion, on motion or otherwise,
orders separate trials consistent with the
interests of justice. (emphasis added).
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the
prosecution is prejudiced by the joinder of
offenses or defendants in an indictment or
information, or by a joinder for trial
toaether, the court shall order an election

The

of separate trials of separate counts,
or grant a severance of defendants, or
provide such other relief as justice
requires.
In

State v. Rivenburg:

*~

-< *,

f)9H (Utah i960), th i s Court stated:
When two or more defendants are jointly
charged with any offense, they shall be
tried jointly, unless the court in its
discretion orders separate trials. If
the ruling of the court deprives the
defendant of a fair trial, then the
judge has abused his discretion. The
discretion may not be exercised arbitrarily,
. In State v. Collins, 612 P. 2d 77 5, 7 ,' / (Utah 1980),
tnis court c 1 a ri f i <M1 f 1 ir-> Rivenburgh sf . i m 1 «I
The trial court must, when defendants are
charged jointly, weigh possible prejudice
to any defendant with considerations of
economy and practicalities of judicial
administration. Doubts concerning prejudice should be resolved by the trial
court in favor of a defendant, but the
trial court must be accorded some discretion in denying a motion for severance.
A denial will be reversed by this Court
only if a defendant's right to a fair
trial has been impaired.
In

Collins, the refusal lo

reverse the lower court's denial of

severance was based on two reasons:
A substantial part of the evidence and
testimony offered by the State was relevant
to charges against each of the defendants
. . . . Equally important, none of the
defenses of either accused was antagonistic
to the interests of any co-defendant. Id,
In the present case, had the statemr r '

%

'
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of the witnesses beei I known prior to tri a 1 . *" < . „ ..-a. •.:ouri
would have been warranted in severing the co-defendants for both

«?i -

of the reasons listed in Collins,

The co-defendant, Joseph

Ridlon, would have argued that severance was necessary because
the highly damaging testimony of Walt and Georgia Moore which,
in many ways, corroborated the testimony of Jeff Richens,
pertained only to the defendant, Johnnie Knight (T. II at 83-84).
The Appellant, Johnnie Knight, would have argued that severance
was necessary because the co-defendant, Ridlon, was going to
implicate Mr, Knight as his defense (T. II at 85-86).
The denial of the motion for mistrial and the surprise
testimony of the Moores resulted in substantial actual prejudice
to Appellant.

The testimony of the Moores was very damaging to

the Appellant but did not even mention the co-defendant, Ridlon.
Therefore the co-defendant argued that it was Appellant and Jeff
Richens who committed the crime.

This theory of the case was

exemplified by the following passage in the co-defendantfs closing
argument:
What happened here, as the case started to
unfold, it started to get clear to me that
what happened was, and I'm looking at the
testimony of the victims, Teresa Jensen and
Bruce Andersen, two individuals came in and
robbed the place. Mr. Andersen indicated
that one was about 6 foot and one was about
5 10. Jeff Richens testified that he's 5 11
and a half, something in that range. Jeff
Richens was in there robbing the place, and
he was in there with Johnnie Knight. He and
Johnnie Knight were together that entire day.
They were in their vehicle together phoning
up people to come and rescue, telling people
their car was broken down, figuring out an
alibi together and sticking with that alibi
until one of them gets in a jam, can't get
out of it, and finally fesses up.
Why does Richens bring Ridlon into this
matter? I don't know. But you heard the
testimony of Chris Laub. And Chris is the
kind of individual you're going to want

around if you're ever robbed because he
pays attention. And he was following these
robbers, followed them to the car, wrote
down the license number. And he's the
only person that saw the driver. In fact
he saw the driver exit the vehicle, lift
up the seat, I guess, and allow someone
to get in. He testified he thinks he
remembers stating to the police at that
time or shortly thereafter that he was
almost positive that the driver was a
female. And that's the person that Mr.
Richens is txyi rig to p r o t e c t .
The Moores take the stand and they corroborate Jeff, and they talk about the fact
that he did in fact call them right after
this robbery and ask them for some help,
an alibi, a ride, whatnot. They never even
heard of Joseph Ridlon. They never mentioned
his name nor did they ever look for Joseph
Ridlon. The entire conversations they
alluded to were between Jeff Richens and
Johnnie Knight.
(j.-.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DECLARE MISTRIAL AFTER EVIDENCE HAD
BEEN ADMITTED STATING THAT THE APPELLANT
HAD BEEN IN PRISON AND ON PAROLE AT THE
TIME OF HIS ARREST.
The Appellant chose to remain silent at trial rather
than taking the stand.

Therefore there was no basis for the

jury to be informed that Mr. Knight had been in prison in the
past, and was on parole at the time of his arrest.

This infor-

mation could only be prejudicial in painting the Appellant as
a bad person.

The information was in no way relevant to the

charges against Appellant.

Yet, on at least three separate

occasions, the jury heard statements (one from the trial judge)
that the Appellant had been in prison, was currently on parole
and incarcerated.

Objections were timely made after each of these

instances and motions for mistrials were argued.
In the first of these instances, defense counsel asked
Jeff Richens if John Shephard was Richensf parole agent.

The

question lent itself to a yes or no answer, but Richens responded,
"He [John Shephard] was —

he was Johnnie Knight's parole agent

at that time, and I believe that is the time they started switching
me from one to another" (T. II at 75). Defense counsel immediately
objected on the grounds that this answer was nonresponsive to
the question and made prejudicial information available to the
jury which otherwise would not be available.

Outside the

presence of the jury defense counsel made a motion for mistrial
based on this prejudicial answer (T. II at 81). This motion was
denied (T. II at 83).

-?6-

In the second instance, after court had adjourned but
*- *
portdti.
reference *
cs jji-i

r. nicei

] d 11 le p r I son trans-

M*-< the men back by 1:30"., unmistakable

• •=> defendant's incarceration.

!iria«.

mistrial

outside

Defense co ,

the presence

o;. :..,<_

jury, where the following exchange occurred between counsel,
Judge Dee, and tra,nsportat: :i oi i off i cer Ton;; Ka ssapaki s :
MS. NESSET-SALE: Oh. I'm sorry. One
other thing I need to make on the record.
It's come to my attention from my client
and the transportation officer that as
the court adjourned and left the bench
you indicated to Tony, the transportation
officer, who was seated at the rear of
the courtroom to have the men back by
1:30, a clear reference to their being
-incarcerated. Of course Tony sits in
the back of the courtroom so that is
not brought to the jury's attention.
They dress in civilian clothes so that •
is not a factor which comes to the
attention of the jury. And I think
the Court making that remark was
improper, and I would again TTV>V„ r >r
a mistrial on that basis.
THE COURT: No. Denied. The 4:;-v was
out of the box.
MS. NESSET-SALE: Out of .
THE COURT: You bet.
MS. NESSET-SALE: Then I wou] <:
THE COURT: Out. Let f s go.
MS. NESSET-SALE: May I - - one more tn* ^
I need to say on the record. I believe if
Tony - - I would proffer that if Tony - I'm sorry, Tony. What is your last na^<
TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: Kassapakis.
MS. NESSET-SALE: - - Kassapakis were called
to testify at a hearing on the motion for a
mistrial that he would say that a majority
of the jurors were still within the courtroom, clearly within earshot, in the area
of the jury box. Is that correct, Tony?
TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: That's correct,
THE COURT: They were out of the box and
walking ou'
What are you doing, calling
me a liar?
i
TRANSPORTS! I
. ,-. ,
,
i not, Your
Honor.
IT

I I at 8 8-89) .

Whether the jurors were in the jury box or out of the jury box
is of little consequence.

The point is, wherever in the court-

room they were, the jurors could and did hear the remark of the
judge.
Finally the third improper remark was made by Walt
Moore as he was being questioned by defense counsel:
Q: You'd known [Johnnie Knight] for how long?
A: Just a few months before that when he got
out of prison.
(T. II at 107). Defense counsel immediately objected (I<d.) and
made a motion for mistrial (T. II at 119). This motion, like
the others, was denied (T. II at 121) .
Many cases have held that the jurors1 conscious or
subconscious connection of the defendant as a jail inmate is
so highly prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.

In Estelle v.

Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the United States Supreme Court
held that a state cannot compel a defendant to stand trial in
identifiable prison clothes.

Although in that case the Court

found that there was no constitutional violation where defense
counsel had failed to object, the Court viewed forcing a defendant
to wear prison clothes to be an abridgement of his fundamental
rights to due process and equal protection of the law.

The Court

further stated that the perception of the defendant created in
the jurors1 minds after seeing the defendant in prison clothes
violates the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Court stated:
The potential effects of presenting an
accused before the jury in prison attire
need not, however, be measured in the
abstract. Courts have, with few exceptions, determined that an accused should

The

not be compelled to go to trial in
prison or jail clothing because of the
possible impairment of the presumption
so basic to the adversary system.
(Citations omitted).
Id. •!*• 504.
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defendant's appearing before a jury in
identifiable prison garb is not measurable,
and it is so potentially prejudicial as to
create a substantial risk of fundamental
unfairness in a criminal trial.
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. -nermore, a. though the

statements ot Jeff Richens and Walt Moore were nade while they
were being questioned uy defonr-.

responsive to the questions asked.

In no way could the answers

given have been anticipated by defense counsel.

Therefore, the

trial court's reasoning in refusing to grant the mistrials that
the answers given were elicited by defense counsel, is illogical.
For these reasons, Appellant contends that he was denied his right
to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant,
Johnnie P. Knight, asked this Court to reverse his conviction
or, alternatively, grant him a new trial.
/J
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day of October, 1985.
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Jo Carol Nessett Salesf Esq.
Legal Defenders Office
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Re: JOHNNY KNIGHT
Case No: 85-48
Motion to Discover
Dear Jo Carol:
Enclosed you will find the requested information on the above
subject.

If we can be of any further assistance please let

us know.
Sincerely,

A ^ ,-/^c
Jo^n Binkerd
Secretary

tfT

enclosures
,

231 East 4th South
Administration
'
Roger A Livingston
Chief Deputy County Attorney
for Administrative Affairs
4th Floor

Ji sttre Division
John T Nielsen
Chief Depc ty
'Vd Floor

Salt Lake City Utah 84111
r

Investigative ^nenry
Don Haiman
Special Agent m Charge
4th Floor
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^

(801) 363-7900
Civil Division
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Chief Deputy
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ADDENDUM B

JO CAROL NESSET-SALE (#2398)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 53 2-5 444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

MOTION TO DISCOVER

Plaintiff
-v-

:

JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT,

:

Defendant

Case No, CR-85-48
Judge David B. Dee

:

The Defendant, JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT, by and through
his attorney of record, JO CAROL NESSET-SALE, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §77-35-16 (1953 as amended) and the Due Process
Clauses of the Constitution of Utah and the United States,
hereby moves this Court as follows:
1.

For an order pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83 (1963), and Utah Code Annotated §77-35-16(a) (4) (1953 as
amended) requiring the Salt Lake County Attorney to disclose
evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant, or
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree
of the offense for reduced punishment that has been discovered
by any member of the agencies involved in the investigation or
prosecution of the above-entitled case.
2.

For an order pursuant to United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97 (1976), and Utah Code Annotated §77-35-16(a)(5)

(1953 as amended) to make the following material evidence
available to defense counsel for inspection and if desired
copying or testing.
A.

A list of all the witnesses that the State

intends to call for trial in the above-entitled matter, their
addresses and telephone numbers;
B.

Any recordings, reports, transcripts, or reports

about statements in possession of any member, or group involved
in the prosecution or the investigation of the above-entitled
case taken from the witnesses listed in point 2A above.
C.

Any criminal convictions or arrests of those

individuals listed in points 2A and 2B above;
D.

Any photographs or other demonstrative evidence

prepared by the County Attorney, its staff, or investigative
agencies during the course of the investigation of the, aboveentitled case;
E.

Statements made by the Defendant to any of the

State's witnesses which the prosecution intends to introduce
against the Defendant at trial and the dates, times, places,
and persons present when such statements were made;
F.

Any reports, results, or questions asked of any of

the State's witnesses as listed in point 2A above who have taken
any form of lie detector test or undergone hypnosis or other
scientific examination with respect to this case;
G.

Reports and conclusions or any experts that the State

intends to call for trial, the particular expert's qualifications,
and any renumeration that the witnesses may be receiving from
the State of Utah, including but not limited to, any medical

testimony relating to injuries incurred by the Defendant or
alleged victim;
H.

Any physical evidence or photographs taken at

the scene of the alleged crime;
I.

Any police or investigative reports made during

the course of the investigation or prosecution of this case;
J.

Reports or descriptions of any weapons or other

physical evidence seized from the Defendant's person or his
residence or his vehicle that the State intends to use at trial;
K.

Any offers of leniency or plea bargain agreements

or any other form of renumeration provided to any of the witnesses
listed in points 2A and 2B above.
WHEREFORE the Defendant moves that this Court issue an
Order granting the relief sought.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

JL

^

day of January, 1985.

^ C ^ ^ < ^ / ^ -~\ *GC< (
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JO CAROL NESSET-SALE
Attorney for Defendant
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this &is

day of January, 1985.

<T 4 ,

yfauv.tiiii-J
-3-

ADDENDUM C

JO CAROL NESSET-SALE (#2398)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF HEARING ON
MOTION TO DISCOVER

Plaintiff
-vJOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT,

Case N o . CR-85-48
Judge David B. Dee

Defendant

TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please be advised that the aboveentitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Friday
the 8 th

day of

February

1985, at the hour of

1:3

°

P .m.,

before the Honorable David B. D e e , Third District Court JudgePlease govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this sp*

day of January, 1985.
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J O ^ € M O L NESSET-SALE
Attorney for Defendant
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, this ^

' - ,/ // i day

of January, 1985
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